LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMME

POLICY BRIEF

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MAIZE SECTOR TRANSFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE: A CASE FOR REFORMS

KEY POINTS

- Maize yields in Zimbabwe have remained significantly lower than other countries in the region and have continued to decline
- Zimbabwe's agricultural sector is characterized by over a million smallholder farming households. The majority of the smallholder farmers have very small landholding sizes, which impact on their ability to produce a maize surplus for sale
- Over 50 percent of the maize sales in Zimbabwe is accounted for by between 4.4 and 6.2 percent of the farmers
- the majority of smallholder farmers do not produce enough to sell but instead retain the little they harvest for home consumption
- The government should consider relooking at SI 142 and SI 145. These instrument has been viewed by the private sector as huge hindrances to their full participation toward the growth and development of the grain sub-sectors. Instead

1. Introduction

The agricultural sector plays a crucial role in the Zimbabwean economy. As such, a vibrant agricultural sector in the country is key to drive pro-poor economic growth and sustainable development, poverty reduction, employment creation and food and nutrition security. However, due to the fragile macroeconomic conditions, the country currently faces huge food deficit. At the centre of the country's food security challenge is the production and marketing of the staple grain, maize. Maize production and productivity has significantly declined and remains too low to secure the country's annual starch requirement and this is due to among others, frequent droughts and less than optimal maize sector policies and/or strategies. The country continues to face substantial financial gap in the agricultural sector as a whole, and this is mainly due to high perceived risks, insufficient funds among financial institutions, the high cost of lending, and lack of formally recognised collateral among many new farmers. As a result, the government has taken centre stage to try to address these gaps through various instruments including command agriculture, designating GMB as the only single buyer and distributor of maize grain, establishment of Silo Food Industries Ltd a state owned commercial grain processing company, announcement of producer prices, stringent import and export controls and mealie meal subsidies through the selected processors. In addition, there is lack of trust between the government and the private sector hence, the caution on the part of government not to allow the private sector to take charge. The existence of an overarching national agricultural policy framework provides the country with an opportunity to have a holistic approach upon which the development of sub-sectoral strategies can be based on. Without holistic and systematic staple grain market reforms, the country's grain needs will continue to be dire and the Treasury will remain overburdened.

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Against this background, this advisory note lays out the recommendation for a package of reforms that are required to deal with the staple grain production and marketing challenges. In particular, the note covers reforms that are required to:

i. Increase role of private sector in the gran sector (with a focus on maize), from production to consumption;

ii. Reduce the current burden on the Treasury in funding the grain sector through production and output subsidies;

iii. Improve efficiency in the management of the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR); and

2. Brief Maize Sector Overview

White maize is the single most important strategic crop in Zimbabwe. It is both the most widely grown smallholder crop and the national staple food. As a consequence, maize features prominently in Zimbabwe's agricultural policy and political economy. The Government through the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water and Rural Resettlement (MLAWRR) support seed production (especially maize), provide agriculture input subsidies to over 1.8 million households to support production and set producer prices to promote local production. Recently the role of private sector in the marketing of grain has been diminished with Grain Marketing Board (GMB) taking centre stage. The discussions about maize sector reforms in Zimbabwe should be grounded in the situation prevailing in the country, hence we present below some important salient characteristics of the sub sector that will better enable the Government to anticipate potential effects of alternative policy actions and reforms.

Maize production and productivity:

1. Maize yields in Zimbabwe have remained significantly lower than other countries in the region and have continued to decline. Since 2000, average yields have remained below one metric tonne per hectare (MT/ha). Rather than productivity gains, the real driver of maize production growth in Zimbabwe has been the area under maize cultivation, which shows an increasing trend with notable dips during drought or El Niño years. Without yield growth, the attainment of national maize surpluses will require bringing more land into maize cultivation, a strategy that is not sustainable.

Landholding size and ability to produce a maize surplus:

2. Zimbabwe's agricultural sector is characterized by over a million smallholder farming households. The majority of the smallholder farmers have very small landholding sizes, which impact on their ability to produce a maize surplus for sale. This means production of maize surplus is correlated to landholding size, even though more than 33 percent of the maize comes from farmers cultivating less than 2 hectares

Maize market is highly concentrated

3. Over 50 percent of the maize sales in Zimbabwe is accounted for by between 4.4 and 6.2 percent of the farmers. Meaning, the narrative that maize output subsidy through high producer price helps smallholder farmers escape poverty tends to ignore the fact that only a small proportion of the farmers participate in maize grain markets, and that the bulk of the sales come from a small minority who are likely to be better off than the rest of the

other smallholder farmers. These are the same farmers who also benefit significantly from the current input support programmes, thereby widening the inequality gap.

Many maize net buyers

4. As discussed earlier, the majority of smallholder farmers do not produce enough to sell but instead retain the little they harvest for home consumption. Data from ZIMVAC shows that the majority of rural farming households are net buyers of grain between 75-85 percent. In the context of a highly concentrated smallholder maize market, government maize purchases at elevated prices serve to transfer significant treasury resources to a small minority of relatively better off farmers. Also, there is evidence that indicates that a small percentage of the rural households consume industrial commercially milled mealie meal. Thus, availability of grain on local markets in the rural areas is very critical especially during the lean season. This means, grain purchases that hauls all surplus maize from production areas to urban areas disadvantages those that would like to access grain to take to the nearest grinding meal.

In urban areas, consumption of straight run meal production supply has to seek other less costly solutions to benefit both urban and rural consumers.

3. Current Government package of policies and strategies in the maize sector

The government has put in place a number of policies and strategies in order deal with challenges facing the maize sector in the country. These policies and strategies are summarized in Figure 1 below. Unfortunately, these tools have been costly to the Treasury with less than optimal results in dealing with the myriad of challenges. The frequent erratic weather patterns and current sub-optimal economic environment in the country make the situation much more complicated to deal with as adopted solutions tend to worsen the situation instead of helping ease the pressure on government.



Figure 1: Package of policies and strategies in the maize sector

5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Immediate actions to increase trust between Government and Private Sector

A relook at the Statutory Instruments SI 142 of 2019 and SI 145 of 2019:

1. The government should consider relooking at SI 142 and SI 145. These instrument has been viewed by the private sector as huge hindrances to their full participation toward the growth and development of the grain sub-sectors. Instead, the SIs have bolstered the propensity of powerful associations and individuals to benefit more at the expense of the whole sub-sector. It is therefore prudent for the government to find other innovative ways of ensuring that the country is food secure without using scares resources for activities that the private sector could finance. Private sector players are happy with status quo as it gives them high returns to investment as government procure, store and sell at subsidized prices to millers. Further subsidies are on maize meal which further increase millers profit levels. As discussed below, the government should facilitate the formation of a semi-autonomous Council comprising members from both the public and private sectors to champion the development and growth of the sector by systematically dealing with maize value chain issues.

Revisiting the country's maize pricing policy

2. As usual, the policy makers are confronted by the classic "food price dilemma." On the one hand, they are under pressure to ensure that maize producers receive a higher price while on the other hand, they are under pressure to keep mealie-meal prices at tolerable prices for consumers. Unfortunately balancing these two competing objectives has been difficult and has resulted in the Treasury being overstretched and agricultural diversification curtailed. It is therefore important do address the maize pricing policy to allow the market to work alongside social protection programmes to help the vulnerable and poor households. Also, the government should have a well-managed price stabilisation policy allowing for clear triggers for releases of grain from the strategic reserves. This would then allow normal seasonal price fluctuations to take place, a key ingredient for encouraging private sector investments into storage and contract farming. For example, an agreed price floor and ceiling could be established, and these would act as triggers for maize purchases or releases under the strategic grain reserve programme.
3. With the country facing another severe maize shortfall it is recommended that the government considers an indicative producer price that is close to the price to which the country will be importing grain and this price should float based on interbank exchange rate. This will create value for the farmers equivalent to what the country would paying for imports without fearing that the value of their delivered grain would be eroded if they are not paid instantly. The rapid price erosion makes it more difficult for the farmer to have resources to prepare for the next season.

Prioritize foreign currency to purchase input raw materials and grain imports

4. For more than a decade, the country has been facing foreign currency shortages due to trade deficit (the value of imports are more than the value of exports). The country has a foreign currency priority list to manage the foreign currency and ensure essential goods and services are available. Priority one comprise critical imports that sustain the country and the economy and these include energy products (petroleum and power), medicines, food imports among others. While agricultural inputs raw materials are also on priority one there are only given priority just before the season or well into the season resulting in the country failing to satisfy the market. The delay in allocating foreign currency to inputs manufacturers result in lost production capacity as this is fixed. Inputs availability and application has a positive correlation with yield levels hence shortage of inputs negatively affect productivity level.
5. Grain imports are funded by Treasury and lines of credit. Grain imports are informed by Crop and Livestock Assessment and Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment reports. These reports are not released well in time to facilitate early planning. Treasury prioritise grain imports in foreign currency allocations but this is usually done late when regional prices would have firmed up. The timing also presents logistical challenges as grain is bulk and require time to move. There is need to strengthen the country's food early warning system to facilitate early planning.

Managing mealie meal prices

6. As the 2020/21 marketing season unfolds, it is realistic to project that maize grain and mealie meal prices in the country will rise given the expected maize production shortfall. Since it is already known that many people would require assistance, it is important to have well-coordinated plan between government, private sector and development partners. If this happens the country's food security will not be severely threated. The solution lies in properly harnessing the many market based solutions discussed below and not for government to become the sole financier of the market.
7. There is need for a fine balance between rewarding farmers and ensuring affordability of the grain products such as maize mealie to vulnerable members of society. Blanket subsidies drain the fiscus and promote rent seeking behaviour by processors and other value chain players. Evidence in Zambia has shown that, passing consumer mealie meal subsidies through commercial processors through popular is not the most effective way to lower retail prices for mealie meal. The subsidy and the delivery mechanism is too costly and usually results in shortages of the subsidised commodity. Recent experience of the Government roller meal subsidy programme showed that allocation and distribution of the product is very difficult and costly to police. This calls for new innovative options to cushion the impacts of poorer and disadvantaged consumers in the urban and rural areas.
8. There is no doubt that maize remains the most popular starch source in the country but there is evidence that consumption patterns are changing as households are now consuming other substitutes including rice and macaroni. In order to help ease the demand for maize, promote agricultural diversification, create a market for other nutritious agricultural products, a triple win (win-win-win), consumer subsidies should come as food vouchers. The food voucher would allow the recipient to redeem their prescribed food items through registered providers which can include small shops. The voucher could have a choice of locally produced food commodities including mealie meal. The value of the voucher would then limit the recipient's choice. Such a programme if developed and funded properly can spur demand from the smallholder farm sector of other agricultural commodities as eggs and milk and value added products at local level. This will create urban-rural linkages expanding markets for various crops and livestock products.
9. Availability of grain in informal markets has been found to help lower the demand for commercially milled maize. So increasing the availability of grain in non-traditional markets at market prices would ease the demand for subsidized commercially milled mealie meal as consumers buy maize and take to the nearest hammer mill. This would keep rural and urban hammer mills running helping create employment. Therefore, the GMB in shortfall years could increase the community sales and supply maize grain directly to consumers and hammer mills at market prices. Providing this cheaper alternative would reduce the government fiscal exposure through consumer subsidies through processors. This system can be operated via the price stabilisation triggers discussed under price stabilization policy

Short to medium-term recommendations

Financing of the Maize Sub-sector:

10. Access to rural finance to facilitate profitable indivisible investments in agriculture remains a challenge, with risk mitigation issues partly unaddressed, and macroeconomic environment unfavorable for private financing. The lack of liquidity and commercial lending to the agricultural sector has forced government to intervene through various instruments including the input and output subsidy programmes and more recently the

implementation of the Special Maize Production Programme (Command Agriculture) providing an assortment of inputs, irrigation and mechanical equipment on a cost-recovery basis to the farm sector including communal, old resettlement, A1, small-scale and A2, irrigation schemes, and institutions such as mission and church farms, universities, colleges, schools, police and prison services, and the Zimbabwe Defense Forces. However, these programmes have been inadequate to unlock the most needed financial resources to have sustainable growth and development in the agriculture sector in general and maize sub-sector in particular. Coupled with SI 142 and SI 145 of 2019 these strategies have instead continued to exert excessive stress on the fiscus. Also, a lot of farmers outside these programmes have continued to face difficulties in accessing input financing.

11. Policies and strategies to urgently harness private sector financing is very critical and should be vigorously pursued as a matter of urgency. Below are some private sector innovations that should be harnessed through harmonizing laws and regulations as well as moving towards a more predictable and consistent policy environment that will incentive private sector to finance various maize value chain activities.

Contract farming and reduction of counterparty risk

12. The maize production and market sector has many players, who compete to supply inputs to farmers or purchase the produced commodity. This environment increases counterparty risk that then curtails private sector willingness to provide input financing and/or province finances through contract farming. Counterparty risk has been very common in the country especially in the cotton sector. This situation has resulted in contract farming arrangements in the maize sector being shunned by the private sector. However, contract farming is a very important instrument required to close the financing gap in the maize sub-sector.
13. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the government to facilitate a dialogue that will culminate into contract farming framework and accompanying laws that safeguard both the investor and the farmer. Also, there is need to promote bundling of insurance with farm credit to increase uptake as well as linking these to regional/global insurance schemes.
14. The current proposals to introduce a SI on agricultural development levy and a stop order system to address the financial gap in the agricultural sector and reduce counterparty risk is a step in the right direction It is important that these innovations are properly designed to ensure that they are not viewed as another tax that will increase the cost of doing business for the farmers and the formal segments of the agriculture sector. Reducing the counterparty risks will help minimize the government exposure in financing inputs and providing output subsidies.

Warehouse Receipts System & input financing

15. A regulated warehouse receipts system in Zimbabwe remain unoperationalised despite the Collateral management largely used by large commercial farmers and/or multinationals in the country is a form of warehouse receipting but the receipts are not tradeable. WRS is a financial inclusion tool that will make the farmers benefit from the storable nature of maize grain through access to credit and using the receipt as collateral.
16. There exists a big opportunity to utilize both public and private sector storage infrastructure to fast track the operationalisation of WRS in the country. However, the Government needs to help instill confidence into potential users by creating an awareness about the benefits

of WRS and lead by example through embracing the innovation in the procurement and disposal of the SGR. Once this is done and the system is established, WRS can easily be used for other commodities including seed cotton, groundnuts, millet, sorghum and beans. Nevertheless, the production levels of these crops are still very low to support such a system on their own, hence value chain development activities for these crops will be required.

17. *Pilot WRS with 25% of SRG*. The current model of purchases employed by the GMB subjects the farmer to deliver the commodity to its satellite depots and wait for payment until the treasury funds the GMB to pay them off. Unfortunately, under the current system the documents which the GMB gives to the farmer cannot be used as collateral to access any finance whilst waiting for their payment. Also, under the current pricing policy, the GMB system does not take into consideration the time value of money and more importantly, it delays farm-level investments. The recommendation is for the GMB to earmark some of its storage facilities in commercial areas for certification under the WRS. The GMB would then start to issue bankable warehouse receipts. This will create confidence in the system given that the GMB through its mandate to manage SGR stocks is one of the largest market players. To be conservative the Government could allow as a pilot at least 25% of the SGR to be procured and traded through this system. This will potentially raise GMB a gross revenue of US$12 500 /month assuming an all-in storage rate of US$0.10 /MT/month. These fund could be ploughed back and pay for SGR stock bought through the traditional system.
18. Promotion of community aggregation. Often, when WRS is discussed questions are raised regarding how smallholder farmers will benefit from the system. At inception, the benefits to smallholder farmers will accrue indirectly through a recognized system of grades and standards allowing high returns among commodity sellers and access to market information. However, direct benefits could accrue to the smallholder farmers through the promotion of aggregation centers. The farmers unions can be encouraged to work with their members to use district associations or cooperatives to aggregate maize grain for delivery to certified warehouses. The receipt can be used to access financing that can be shared by the members. This is important because financial institutions will not be dealing with too many small farmers. However, farmer unions need to be capacitated to be able to deal with governance issues of these associations and/or cooperatives. There are already interventions around community aggregation and storage by the World Food Programme and private grain traders and lessons can be learnt from these pilots.
19. *Input financing schemes*. Experiences in other countries have shown that large commercial banks are not very keen to finance agriculture because of the perceived high risk and often their interest rates are prohibitive especially for small-scale farmers who do not have the capacity or muscle to negotiate a better rate. The WRS should allow input companies to take the receipts to finance input requirements of farmers. This will remove the need for a bank to work with many smallholder farmers instead the banks can work with input providers.

Commodity Exchange

20. A functional WRS in Zimbabwe will contribute to the development of the derivatives market, attracting more capital into the country. It will also help to address the counterparty risk one key problem in contract farming because product delivery is guaranteed
21. Given that the market for maize is prone to interventions, there is need for a deliberate move at procuring strategic grain reserves through a commodity exchange, implying that

the Warehouse Receipts Act must be operationalized, this could also contribute towards filling the existing financial gap and limiting the exposure of the Treasury. With a functional WRS it would be easier for the country to establish a commodity exchange similar to the one hosted by JSE (SAFEX). All transaction on SAFEX are backed up by physical stocks in silos owned by warehouse operators and/or commercial farmers.

Market Information System

22. Policy inconsistencies around grain markets usually arise from the lack of confidence in information on prices, stock levels and movement in the country. Hence, investments in information systems are necessary to address there information asymmetries that at times lead the Government to intervene in the market. This could be done through the establishment of an independent Grain Information Service (GIS), with a secretariat supported by a minuscule levy (e.g. 10 cents per Metric Tonne) of maize grain marketed through the formal system. A good example of a functional grain information system in the region is the South Africa Grain Information Service which is private-sector led and funded but provides very useful market information to guide investments in the maize sector. The service would provide market information on production, stocks and processing demand and processed products for maize and other key commodities.

Management of the strategic reserve

23. The Strategic Reserve (SR) financing and management is currently the preserve of the GMB. The SR is composed of physical grains and monetary equivalent. Funding of both operations and management of the strategic grain reserve is the responsibility of government. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development is responsible for funding while Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water and Rural Resettlement is responsible for operations and management of the strategic reserve through GMB.
24. Private sector financing: There are opportunities for private sector to participate in the management and financing of the strategic reserve through the WRS as discussed above. Also private milling companies and grain traders can finance purchasing and storage of their raw materials (grains) serving the Treasury the burden of financing these activities. Private sector companies should be allowed to procure, store and use grain purchased using own resources. The grains stored in private companies' silos should be counted as part of the national strategic grain. Private companies should be incentivised and encouraged to import maize for own use during deficit years.

25. Harnessing Development Partners Assistance: Government should provide tax incentives to the private sector to start making arrangements for maize imports of their requirements. A hybrid system should be adopted where a processor who wants to access subsidised maize grain from GMB should be compelled to import an equivalent amount. For example, a 50 percent split hybrid procurement arrangement would save public resources. As before, the development partners could be approached to assist with bridging the foreign currency gap, by exchanging foreign currency with RTGS $ at a mutually agreed rate. This facility would allow the private sector to bring in maize grain into the country at a time when it is needed the most. On the other hand, the

development partners could use the RTGS to enhance their other equally important social protection programmes such as the social cash transfer programmes or help government pilot the suggested food voucher programme.

26. The main advantage of this strategy is that it would limit Government's fiscal exposure by harnessing private sector financing to pay for their requirements without GMB buying for them. The other notable advantage is that farmers who accessed Command Agriculture support would still be able to pay back their dues through GMB. If this is done, the possibility that the country could quickly move back to an open market system where private trade in maize grain is allowed will be enhanced.
27. *Piloting Virtual reserves*: There is need to build capacity of GMB to embrace new innovations in managing the country's strategic reserves and in this case adding to its portfolio virtual stocks. Thus the GMB should consider purchasing and holding a grain option from a regional commodity exchanges 'virtual stocks' such as SAFEX to be drawn upon when responding to unforeseen deficits, rather than purchasing and holding large physical stocks, as this has fiscal implications and crowds-out private sector participation. The establishment of the Grains Council comprised of public and private sector players to oversee production and marketing issues in the maize sector would help provide guidance on what proportion of the strategic reserve should be held as virtual stock. Adopting such an innovations is expected to reduce treasury costs associated with buying and holding huge reserves.

Role of Silo Food Industries Ltd

28. Silo Food Industries Ltd (SFI) is whole owned GMB subsidiary with the role of stabilising food prices of grain products. Silo foods is a product of the GMB commercial operations which were separated from the SGR operations. This was meant to improve efficiency of the commercial operations and allow GMB to concentrate on SGR management for the country.
29. Silo Food Industries is expected to operate like any other grain milling and trading company. Its relationship with GMB (holding company) may result in unfair completion due to access to raw materials (maize grain). However, balancing commercial and social functions would be very difficult. There is a very high likelihood that under the current situation, insider trading will happen, and this will disrupt grains market activities. Competition in the grains industry is stiff with most companies having excess milling and storage capacities. SFI may not therefore be able to compete on technological and distributional capabilities but on access to raw materials and probably favourably raw material payment terms. Therefore, it is important that SFI's role in the market is clearly defined as ad hoc actions will disrupt the growth and development of the grain sector.

babwe's agricultural production system is in the process of renewal and transformation. After a series of shocks induced by poor economic performance, accelerating climate change and a global pandemic, the time has clearly come to move on from "business as usual" and embrace the future. As an exceptionally resource-rich and bio diverse country, it makes strategic sense to the harness the capabilities of these natural and biological resources towards economic growth and sustainability. One of the most underutilized yet high potential categories of biological resource available to Zimbabwe is its wealth of indigenous plants and associated traditional knowledge.

There are nearly 6,000 plant species in Zimbabwe. At least 900 of these (15%) have been used traditionally as foods or medicines, and yet our current agricultural system makes use of only a handful. Instead, we have focused our production efforts on crops that originate elsewhere in the world, making us vulnerable to the vagaries of international commodity prices and unpredictable rainfall. Changing this focus represents a quick and easy win for Zimbabwean farmers and sets the foundations for sustained economic growth going forward.

Concurrent with the need to transform Zimbabwe's agricultural system, a global shift in economic thinking has occurred. Dubbed the "Great Reset" by the World Economic Forum in 2020, this shift recognizes the urgent need to reduce our dependency on fossil fuels, meet global emissions targets, adapt to changing climate conditions and create a "greener, smarter, fairer world in the future".

As a bridging mechanism to unite these two different strands, the emergent notion of the Bioeconomy is an approach that speaks directly to Zimbabwe's strengths. With its breadth of biological resources and depth of traditional knowledge around their sustainable use, Zimbabwe is exceptionally well-positioned to transition quickly and effectively into a flourishing bioeconomy

This report presents 25 indigenous plant species that have the potential to be adopted at a significant scale in Zimbabwe as smallholder crops. These plants have been selected not only for their ability to generate better and more environmentally sustainable financial returns for smallholders (especially those living in dryland regions) but also for their potential to advance the discourse towards a national bioeconomy strategy for Zimbabwe.

As a follow-up to this study, it is therefore recommended that:

i) A national workshop is convened to discuss the potential role of indigenous plants in a Zimbabwe's agricultural transformation process and develop a broad strategy for the integration of indigenous plants into the production system.

ii) Following on from this workshop, a multi-stakeholder Indigenous Plant Action Team be convened under the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture to drive the implementation of this strategy.

iii) Separately a team be established to develop a first draft National Bioeconomy Strategy for Zimbabwe for further consultation and eventual adoption.

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ABOUT LFSP:

- The Zimbabwe Livelihoods and Food Security Programme (LFSP), Agriculture Productivity and Nutrition Component (APN) is managed by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), with the aim of contribute to poverty reduction through increased incomes for a target 250,000 smallholder farming households. The programme is being implemented in four provinces covering 12 districts as follows: Mutasa, Mutare, and Makoni in Manicaland; Guruve, Bindura, Mazowe and Mt Darwin in Mashonaland Central; Kwekwe, Gokwe North, Gokwe South and Shurugwi in Midlands and Zvimba in Mashonaland West provinces. FAO is in partnership with three NGO consortia led by Practical Action, Welthungerhilfe and World Vision International, two Strategic Technical partners i.e. **IAPRI** for policy influence, HarvestPlus for biofortification, three Commercial Banks, 1 Wholesale Facility - the Zimbabwe Microfinance Fund (ZMF), 5 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and the USAID managed DCA Facility. To date the LFSP is funded for two phases to the tune of £72.4m.

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